Securing applications in personal computers: the relay race approach. by Wright, James Michael
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1991-09
Securing applications in personal computers: the
relay race approach.
Wright, James Michael


















Thesis Advisor: Moshe Zviran







SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved tor public release; distribution is unlimited.
DE CLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
>ERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
onterey.CA 93943 5000
7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943 5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
: ADDRESS (C/ty, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
Program Hement No Project No Idik No Worn unit Accession
Number
TITLE (Include Security Classification)
iCURING APPLICATIONS IN PERSONAL COMPUTERS: THE RELAY RACE APPROACH
2 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Wright, James M.













18 SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Security, Personal Computer, Apphcaion Level, Microcomputer
9 ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
'his Thesis reviews the increasing need lor security in a personal computer (PC) environment and proposes a new approach for securing PC
.pplications at the application layer. The Relay Race Approach extends two standard approaches: data encryption and password access control at
he main program level, to the subprogram level by the use of a special parameter, the "Baton." The applicability of this approach is demonstrated
n an original Basic application and an existing Dbasel V application, representing both third generation language (3GL) and fourth generation
anguage (4GL) environments. The Approach can add to overall network security in the PC LAN environment as well. The Approach is
uccessful and proposed enhancements can strengthen the Approach.
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
Q UNCI ASSIHLD'UNllMlUL) J S.iMI AS KLPOR1 DIIC UStHS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Unclassified
2a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
rfoshe Zviran




>D FORM 1473. 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Securing Applications in Personal Computers:
The Relay Race Approach
by
James Michael Wright
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., University of Florida, 1980
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of





This Thesis reviews the increasing need for security in
a personal computer (PC) environment and proposes a new
approach for securing PC applications at the application
layer. The Relay Race Approach extends two standard
approaches : data encryption and password access control at
the main program level, to the subprogram level by the use
of a special parameter, the "Baton" . The applicability of
this approach is demonstrated in an original Basic
application and an existing Dbase IV application,
representing both third generation language (3GL) and fourth
generation language (4GL) environments. The Approach can
add to overall network security in the PC LAN environment as
well. The Approach is successful and proposed enhancements
can strengthen the Approach.
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I . INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of information systems in virtually
all areas of business and government has increased the
importance of computer security issues . As more people
become computer literate, the risks of ill-intentioned
individuals obtaining unauthorized access or violating the
integrity and validity of data grow. Potential solutions to
computer security risks are varied and numerous because
different types of computer hardware, operating systems, and
application software have different security strengths and
weaknesses
.
Different environments and applications require varying
levels of security and security measures . Some environments
need to target their security measures toward threats of
accidental data corruption while others are primarily
concerned with unauthorized access to sensitive information.
Another computer security issue is system protection from
viruses, worms, trojan horses, etc.
Widespread use of personal computers and growth of end
user computing have introduced myriad security concerns.
Almost every personal computer user is likely to view virus
protection, data backup, floppy disk control, and data
encryption as primary computer security issues (Murray 1989,
Stephenson 1989, Brown 1989) . However, many personal
computer security concerns for the most part remain largely
unaddressed at this time (Pfleeger, 1989) . Moreover, the
growing population of knowledgeable personal computer users
increases the numerical chances of security breaches
involving personal computers
.
This research explores the unique security issues
involving personal computers and proposes a new approach for
securing personal computer applications and data.
II. SECURITY IN PERSONAL COMPUTERS
The use of personal computers, including microcomputers,
office automation workstations and intelligent workstations,
has spread substantially in recent years . Since the
introduction of these systems, in the late 1970s, they have
undergone far reaching changes and improvements which have
brought them almost to the level of performance of large
computers (Giladi and Zviran, 1989) . Analysis of the
development and characteristics of personal computers and
large systems shows that the processing speed of present
personal computers is equal or even superior to that of the
main large systems that were in use during the late 1970s
(e.g., IBM 370 series)
.
The basic security problems for personal computers are
the same as those for every other computing environment:
applications require secrecy, integrity and availability
applied to programs and data. However, security problems of
personal computers are more serious than those of mainframes
or mini computers due to the lack of security tools and
mechanisms. Many of the hardware and software facilities
important in assuring security are inappropriate and
unavailable in the personal computer environment
.
The security problem of personal computers is becoming
even more meaningful as these machines are being integrated
into computer networks. While many personal computers are
being used in a stand-alone mode, others are being connected
to networks as front-end terminals and processors, becoming
a weak link in the network security chain. This problem
becomes more crucial in the open system interconnection
(OSI) environment. As the goal of an OSI environment is
approached it becomes easier and more economical to connect
computers and share resources. Logically, more PCs will be
integrated into network systems. As a result, national
organizations as well as users are becoming concerned with
the vulnerability of personal computers (NCSC, 1985/ NTISSC,
1987; Post and Kievit, 1991) .
As the name implies, personal computers were initially
envisioned as being used by one person. Simple physical
security measures would supply the necessary measure of
security. This single user view is evident in the design of
the popular personal computer operating system, MS-DOS. In
most organizations today however, PCs are not personally
allocated (Gogan, 1991) . In view of this, more security is
sometimes required. There is a definite lack of tools to
provide security for personal computers
.
As the popularity and power of personal computers grows,
more people want and obtained access to them. Personal
computers distribute computing power to virtually all
physical locations within an organization, unlike large
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machines. For the first time the computing power is not
under the control of computer professionals. Persons
responsible for mainframe or mini-computer security have
limited control over how personal computers were being used
within organizations. Generally, personal computer users
lack the sensitivity toward computer security issues
exhibited by mainframe and mini computer operators . The
personal and organizational computer security mechanisms




The first IBM personal computer was built around the
8088 processor. This processor had no protection scheme.
All memory locations were open and unguarded. There were no
privileged instructions available only t.o the operating
system or trusted kernel. The newer 80286 and 80386 CPUs
have stronger protection capabilities but the MS-DOS
operating system is not capable of exploiting them (Post,
1991; Pfleeger, 1989)
.
Common hardware add-on security measures include
physical security measures, security modules, and locks and
keys
.
Each provides various degrees of security against
certain types of threats while exhibiting weaknesses against
others
.
Locking doors to rooms containing computers is effective
but in most cases not feasible. Too often it is necessary
to allow open access to a room containing the computer.
Disconnecting and locking the computer' s keyboard in a desk
drawer or cabinet provides good security without limiting
access to an office space. Unfortunately, physical security
measures limit access to all of the computer's programs, not
just the sensitive ones. This weakness can lead to under-
use of computer assets
.
Security modules are expansion boards which plug into
industry standard slots on personal computer motherboards to
provide security. They usually perform in concert with
software utilities. Security modules usually prevent
booting from other than the fixed hard disk drive. This
ensures that access control software stored on the fixed
disk is run upon boot-up. Because the modules must plug
into standard slots for compatibility reasons it would be
easy for an intruder to locate and remove them. Many casual
personal computer users possess sufficient knowledge to
quickly open a computer's case, identify specific expansion
boards and remove the security module (Stephenson, 1989;
Zarger, 1988)
.
Key type locks coupled to power switches are often used
in personal computers as security measures . These locks are
an "all or nothing" device. Those who have a key have
6
access to all programs and data and those who do not have a
key have access to nothing. They cannot provide universal
access to public applications and provide security for
private programs and data. Additionally, locking power
switches can be defeated quite easily if the computer is
housed in a standard case. Once the standard "easy access"
case is opened, it is a simple matter to "hot wire" the
switch to defeat the lock.
Hardware security solutions are enhanced when cases and
fasteners are used which are non-standard and require
special tools or keys for access or removal. Additionally,
epoxy coatings are useful in protecting hardware items from
tampering measures such as hot wiring switches . As with
most security issues, using optimum combinations of security




Any computer system has, usually, two different types of
software: an operating system and application programs. The
operating system consists of the system programs, command
interpreter, and utilities. The operating system is the
focal point for exploring security issues. Application
programs are those which accomplish processing desired by
the computer user. Application programs make calls to, or
use, the operating system to accomplish lower level tasks.
1 . Operating Systems
The operating system is the inner-most software
layer of a computer system according to the "virtual
machine" model (Tanenbaum, 1990) . It accomplishes tasks for
users and/or the application programs and shields them from
complex hardware details. Transparent to users and
applications, the function of the operating system is to
present the user with the equivalent of an extended machine
or virtual machine that is easier to program than the
underlying hardware. Its primary task is to keep track of
resource usage, to grant resource requests and account for
their usage, and to mediate conflicting requests from
different programs and users (Tanenbaum, 1987)
.
At their advent, personal computers were initially
equipped with 4 KB of main memory. The operating system had
to be small enough to be loaded into this small memory space
and still leave room for an application program to run. The
early developers of personal computers and their operating
systems did not expect these machines to grow in popularity
as they have. The operating system was written to provide
compactness and functionality in a "personal" environment.
This meant one user, one program at a time. Under MS—DOS,
anyone with basic knowledge can access and/or change any
8
file or memory location. The current trend is toward
personal computer power houses shared by several workers
able to run several applications simultaneously utilizing up
to 8 MB of main memory. With multiple users instead of the
envisioned personal use, MS-DOS does not provide any measure
of security. In examining MS-DOS it is clear that it has
limitations which cripple its capability to grow into a
full-fledged operating system capable of supporting and
managing systems which are now in demand.
MS-DOS' s major limitation is that when conceived, it
allotted only enough bits in its address format to access a
maximum of 640 kilobytes of main memory directly. This
limit remains in place today because of market pressures for
downward compatibility. The most powerful applications
programs tend to use most of the 640 kb of memory leaving
only enough for the underlying operating system. To install
security mechanisms in MS-DOS would undoubtedly reduce the
memory space available for use by application programs to an
even lower value. It seems that the market pressure for
freeing up memory for applications is far greater than any
pressure to add security functions to MS-DOS.
Although most operating systems for large systems
provide adequate security functions, MS-DOS continues to
serve as the personal computer standard with virtually no
security capability. Market pressure for compatibility and
9
maximum application space will defeat any move to retrofit
MS-DOS with security functionality.
2. Utilities
Utilities are separate system programs that
accomplish tasks for users. Their normal function is system
management. Since they are optional, commercial software
programs are not written to use them. Utility programs are
very important in security of personal computer systems.
Because the operating system has no security capability,
personal computer users often use utility programs to
protect their data and programs . There are several
different ways in which utility programs are commonly used
for security in the personal computer environment . These
include encryption of data, password hard disk drive locks
with or without hardware locks, and disk residue
eliminators. The best commercially available solutions
include elements of all three (Stephenson, 1989)
.
Encryption of data using utility programs provides
excellent security of data. The application program can be
run by intruders but the data they receive will be nonsense
unless first decrypted. Encryption and decryption can be
accomplished automatically using batch command files. There
are two limitations which come to mind in using data
encryption utilities. Data file encryption and decryption
are disk intensive activities and consequently are very
10
slow. Additionally, simply securing the data does not keep
intruders from running the application program. It simply
keeps the intruder from understanding the data. In some
cases it may be desirable to ensure intruders are unable to
run the application program at all.
Password hard disk drive boot locks are programs
which require password authentication to boot and
subsequently access the hard drive. They are fast, compact
and work well against casual, novice intrusion attempts.
Without hardware enhancements, however, they can be bypassed
if the intruder boots the computer from a bootable MS-DOS
floppy (Stephenson, 1989)
.
Additionally, access to even non-sensitive programs
on the protected system requires password authentication.
This limits the use of computer resources to trusted
password holders only. In many cases it is desirable to
secure only a portion of the functions the personal computer
helps perform.
Other utilities rid secondary memory of residue.
When files on personal computers are deleted their data
remains. The operating system simply deletes the file from
the directory, rendering it unlocatable. Intruders can read
or copy portions of the memory media in search of sensitive
data. Simply deleting files does not protect the
information. Utilities such as Norton's wipe disk and wipe
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file rewrite the disk or file entirely with meaningless
data. This destroys all residue left from sensitive files.
These types of utilities are often bundled with
hardware which disallows booting from any disk except the
one protected by the software.
3 . Applications
Application programs are the outer layer of software
in the virtual machine model . The application software is a
program which interfaces with the user and ensures that the
tasks the user wishes to accomplish are completed. The
application program makes calls to the operating system to
accomplish low level tasks in order for the application to
accomplish tasks initiated by the user. The application
software is shielded from hardware details by the operating
system.
The operating system, MS-DOS, provides no security
capability and utilities leave possible back doors and
require password access procedures for all applications. If
application programs provide their own security capability
only programs which require security would require passwords
for access. Moreover, common back doors associated with
security utility programs are closed to intruders when
application programs contain protection schemes.
Application programs that need no protection are not limited
by running under a larger, hypothetical, security-capable
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operating system which would use more of the 640 kb main
memory than the unprotected MS-DOS. A minor drawback to
applications providing their own protection is that the
consequential increase in program size occurs in each
secured application program. This is a minor drawback as
the additional required disk storage space would small . The
additional RAM would be required only by programs needing




Two views of data security prevail: protection against
inadvertent data loss and protection of unauthorized access
to sensitive data. Inadvertent data loss is a problem of
valuable, but not necessarily sensitive, data (Mensching and
Adams, 19 91) . Procedures for precluding inadvertent data
loss have been common knowledge since the personal
computer's inception and will not be addressed here. Since
the operating system as described previously provides no
built-in file protection measures, data file encryption must
be used to secure data in personal computers
.
Utilities are commonly used to encrypt and decrypt data
files to ensure protection of sensitive data. Some hardware
add-on boards also possess the capability to automatically
encrypt and decrypt data files. There are many different
13
algorithms to encrypt and decrypt data. Some of which are
considered to be safer than others. The Data Encryption
Standard (DES) is the most common one, initially developed
for the U.S. government for use by the general public.
D. PERSONNEL
Sensitivity to security issues and an attitude of
responsibility on the part of all users in a personal
computer environment are necessary for other measures to
succeed in providing security. Whereas mainframes and other
large systems have separate locked rooms and expert
operators shielding them, personal computers are vulnerably
distributed throughout an organization. For instance, no
security system can succeed if a user leaves the area while
a sensitive application is running. No matter how strong
the security system, it is useless unless personnel have a
healthy attitude toward security and are sensitive to
possible threats (Pfleeger, 1989) .
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III. THE RELAY RACE APPROACH
A. INTRODUCTION
In view of the personal computer operating system'
s
inability to provide security and the limitations associated
with security modules and utilities, it becomes worthwhile
to explore new techniques for securing individual
application programs. Three major threats to the security
of an application can be countered, to include unauthorized
execution of the main program, data disclosure and
unauthorized execution of parts of the program by executing
subprograms directly. Traditional methods cover encryption
of data files and securing main programs, while the Relay
Race Approach extends protection to the subprogram level.
1 . Application Access Control
Personal computers are often used by different
individuals running different application programs (Gogan,
1991) . In most cases, all applications are stored on the
same hard disk drive. Allowing access to certain programs
by certain individuals while limiting access to valid users
of other protected programs stored on the same disk is no
trivial task in the PC environment . Since the MS-DOS
operating system provides no security kernel, the solutions
must be coded into the application programs. Each
application program must check for access authorization and
15
take required measures to secure itself against intrusion.
This is usually accomplished by an application-oriented
Password checking scheme which protects the application at
the main menu level
.
2 . Data File Security
Intrusion is usually for the purpose of achieving
access to the system data. One intrusion technique is to
bypass the application programs entirely and attempt to gain
access to the system data files directly. An intruder could
simply browse the file or copy it for later examination at
another computer. To overcome this problem, data files must
be encrypted.
3 . Intra-application Controls
The growth in application software capabilities and
the consequent growth in size has dictated that applications
be designed as a collection of programs. In such a scheme,
a main program calls on subprograms to accomplish specific
tasks in support of the system. The main program can be
secured with a password-checking scheme to prevent its
unauthorized execution. However, access to functions and
data can sometimes be achieved by executing subprograms
directly without the main program, as depicted in Figure
3.1. To preclude this type of intrusion some method of
ensuring that all subprograms are called by their proper












Data Encryption Protection Sphere
Figure 3.1 : Password and Encryption
Spheres of Protection
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approach explored in this research will be called the relay
race approach.
B. IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS
In order to counter the three threats three methods of
protection are implemented in The Relay Race Approach. The
first two measures are commonly used in the personal
computer environment in an attempt to secure applications.
One is basic password checking upon execution ensures user
authorization, and the second employs automatic data
encryption, decryption and deletion preclude theft of raw
data files. However, to preclude program execution via an
unprotected subprogram, all subprograms will check for a
parameter which can only be valid if the subprogram was
called via the main program as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
This is a unique measure applied to individual application
programs and it is from this third measure that the approach
receives its name. In much the same way relay racers must
pass a baton or be disqualified, subprograms must receive a
certain parameter and pass it to subsequent subprograms or
the program execution will be halted by the security system.
1 . Password Storage and Management
There are two methods of storing valid passwords to
be used by the system to authenticate users: including valid
















Figure 3.2: Password and Encryption
Spheres of Protection extended to
subprograms using the Relay Race
Approach.
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in encrypted data files. Including passwords in source code
provides simplicity and security but requires recompilation
for each password change. Using encrypted data files
containing valid passwords precludes requirement for source
code dissemination to user/ administrator but requires
thoughtful implementation to ensure security. An intruder
could encrypt his/her own password file with a different key
and replace the real password file with his/her version
(same filename) . In order to defeat this intrusion scheme
the system must check to determine whether the password file
is real or one planted by an intruder. The valid password
file will contain a password to be checked against one in
the compiled code. The intruder's file would not work if it
did not contain this file checking password. A combination
of both encrypted data file and compiled password ensures
security and precludes source code dissemination and
recompilation for routine password changes.
2 . Baton and Baton Passing
In order to ensure that subprograms are executed
only when called by proper calling programs a global
variable, or parameter, can be set upon password
authentication and passed from the main program to the
called subprograms. Subprograms can, in turn, pass the same
parameter to any subprograms they call. Each subprogram can
begin execution by checking this parameter before executing
20
further and halt processing if the parameter is invalid.
This is analogous to a relay race at a track meet . Without
the baton being properly passed and received the relay team
cannot complete the race
.
3 . Data File Encryption
Two types of encrypted data files are required for
the relay race baton scheme: password file and data storage
files. The password file is decrypted, and the decrypted
file is then read and deleted. The decryption process
leaves the encrypted file intact so that when the system
deletes the decrypted files, the original encrypted password
file remains for use in future access attempts. Data
storage files must be decrypted for reading and recrypted if
new data is added or other changes are made. Once again all
files decrypted during a process need to have the decrypted
copy deleted as soon as possible after they are re-
encrypted.
21
IV. APPLICATION IN A THIRD GENERATION LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT
A. ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION
A simple test application was developed in compiled MS-
BASIC. BASIC was chosen as the third generation language
for a prototype due to its relatively low power and
programmers' wide exposure to it. If the relay race scheme
can be implemented in BASIC, it is reasonable to assume that




The prototype application is a simple, menu-driven,
maritime minefield planning program designed to minimize the
necessity for accurate small scale plotting on geographic
charts. The program has options to input planning data,
calculate mine drop instructions, save instructions to disk,
and print instructions. The application programs and data
are protected using The Relay Race Approach.
The MS-DOS directory presentation for the application is
provided in Figure 4.1. BASRUN20.EXE is a runtime package
required for applications compiled separately such as the
minefield planning application. MFPLAN.EXE is the main
program containing password checking code and opening menu.
The remaining .EXE files are subprograms which accomplish
22
the application's tasks. $ED.MNQ and $ED.NMQ are encrypted
data and password files respectively.
$ED MNQ 560 5-19-91 9:24p
$ED NMQ 128 2-10-91 6:57p
BASRUN2 EXE 63046 6-25-85 4:42p
MFPLAN EXE 3415 5-19-91 7:55p
MINECALC EXE 4615 5-19-91 7:56p
MINEPRNT EXE 2503 5-19-91 7:57p
MINESAVE EXE 2887 5-19-91 7:56p
MLRETREV EXE 2279 5-19-91 7:57p
Figure 4,1: MS-DOS Directory presentation of
the application
The threat of intrusion via subprogram defeating the
password authorization and data encryption without baton
passing is illustrated in a structure chart of an intrusion
attempt (Figure 4.2) . When unprotected, an intruder needs
only to write a small BASIC program to call MLRETREV.EXE and
MINEPRNT.EXE in order to gain access to the system's
sensitive data. By combining password checking, data
encryption and the Relay Race Approach, this intrusion is
thwarted (Figure 4.3) .
C. TRANSFORMING CONCEPTS TO CODE
1
.
Handling Passwords and the Baton
The first operation the scheme must accomplish is
password checking. This operation is be accomplished as













Figure 4,2: Slruclurc chart illustrating
how an intruder's program could call






















Figure 4.3: Structure chart of Mine
field Piannine Program
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the required BASIC source code to handle passwords and
password checking and initialize the security baton. Line 9
allows the program to be recalled from subprograms without
requesting a password each time the main menu appears.
Lines 40, 50 and 60 blank the display screen for password
entry, input password and return normal function to the
display screen. Line 70 creates a decrypted copy of the
valid password file and names it "PWORD.DAT". During the
execution of the "RCRYPT" program, the user will be prompted
to enter an encryptation key twice. Line 80 opens the
PWORD.DAT file for input. Lines 90, 100, 110 initialize
several variables to be used: N, a loop counter; FOUND$, a
flag indicating wether a password is found to be valid or
not; and BATON$, the global variable or parameter passed to
subprograms to verify that access authorization has been
checked prior to subprogram execition. If the password file
is found to be empty, line 120 will call the violation
routine, (lines 220-290)
. Lines 140 and 150 input and check
the first entry in the password file and ensure it is
"scud" . This defeats intruders who might plant their own
encrypted password file in place of the original. If an
imposter password file is detected the violation routine is
run. Lines 160-200 are the password checking loop where the
input password (PASSWORD$) is checked against each valid
password in the file (VALIDPWORD$ (N) ) . If end of file (EOF)'
26
is reached without a match the violation routine is run. If
a match is found, lines 300-320 are run in order to close
the password file, delete it and set the security baton
(BATON$) valid. This allows subprograms to be called and
run. The violation routine (lines 220-290) also closes and
deletes the password file. Lines 240-260 provide a pause
situation allowing displayed text message to be read by
users before continuing program execution. Lines 350 to 450
represent location of functioning non-security related
application code.
27
9 IF BATON$ = "VALID" then GOTO 330
10 LOCATE 13,10
20 PRINT "Enter your password and press ENTER."





7 SHELL "RECRYPT $ED.NMQ PWORD.DAT"
80 OPEN "PWORD.DAT" for INPUT as #1
90 N =
100 FOUND$ = "F"
110 BATON$ = "INVALID"
120 IF EOF(l) GOTO 220
140 INPUT# 1, FILECHK$
150 IF FILECHK$ = "scud" then GOTO 160 else GOTO 220
160 IF EOF(l) GOTO 220
170 N = N + 1
180 INPUT#1, VALIDPWORD$ (N)
190 IF PASSWORD$ = VALIDPWORD$ (N) THEN FOUND$ = "T"
200 IF FOUND$ = "T" then GOTO 300 else GOTO 160
210 LOCATE 17,10
220 PRINT "Security Violation!"
230 LOCATE 19,10
240 PRINT "Press any key to continue."
250 A$ = INKEY$






320 BATON $ = "VALID"





Figure 4.4: Code required to check user's password
and set "baton" variable
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2 . Called Subprogram Requirements
Subprograms require very little additional code to
accomplish the relay race scheme. As the baton is passed by
the COMMON mechanism (sharing variables and values among
programs), a simple check of the security baton (BATON$)
must be made before each program execution. If the value
passed by this variable is valid, execution continues . If
the value passed by this variable is found to be invalid, it
means that the subprogram was called without valid password
authentication. A violation routine is run and the program
is aborted. Required source code for subprograms is
presented in Figure 4.5.
3 OPTION BASE 1
4 DIM YTD (10) ,TTD (10)
5 COMMON BATON$,NA$, LAH$, IPLAD, IPLAM, IPLAS , LOH$
,
IPLOD, IPLOM, IPLOS, SPD, TRK, N,YTD()
,
TTD ()





70 PRINT "Security Violation!"
80 LOCATE 19,10
90 PRINT "Press any key to c:ontinue ?i
100 A$ = INKEY$
110 IF A$ = "" then 110
120 END
Figure 4.5: Code required in subprograms
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3. Data Encryption, Decryption and Access Requirements
a. Data Encryption Utility
The encryption program used in this prototype
is RCRYPT.COM, an MS-DOS utility. Many different data
encryption utilities are available and most will work within
this scheme. The application may need to be modified
slightly depending on whether the encryption utility
requires the key to be entered on the command line as a
parameter or prompts the user for the key during execution.
The RCRYPT.COM utility in the prototype prompts for the key
during execution.
Jb. Data File Manipulation
This prototype uses one password file and one
data file. A flat file of records is used because data for
this application is small and response time is not a
critical issue. AS shown in Figure 4.6 most of the data
manipulations focus on decrypting and reading data. One
subprogram (MINESAVE) allows for appending data to the data
file. This case requires decrypting the data file,
appending new data to the file and re-encrypting the file.




- decrypts password file
- reads password file
- deletes password file
MINECALC
- no data file
operations
MINEPRNT











Figure 4.6: Description of data file manipulations
for each of the programs in the Basic
prototype application.
4 PRINT "What name would y'OU like to call the data?"
50 INPUT NA$
60 SHELL "RCRYPT $ED.MNQ MINE. DAT"
7 OPEN ' MINE. DAT" for APPEND as #2
80 WRITE #2,NA$,LAH$, IPLAD, IPLAM, IPLAS ,LOH$ , IPLOD,
IPLOM, IPLOS, SPD, TRK,
N
90 FOR B = 1 to N
100 WRITE #2,YTD (B) , TTD (B)
110 NEXT B
120 CLOSE #2
130 SHELL "RCRYPT MINE . DAT $ED.MNQ"
140 KILL "MINE. DAT"




The application requires a system administrator
to accomplish certain tasks . These tasks include steps to
start the system, accomplishing data file housekeeping and
changing passwords . Since it is not desirable to supply
source code to all users, the application deliverables
should include information indicating what the first entry
in the password file needs to be. This entry should be
unique or nearly unique among different copies of the
application to preclude one systems administrator from
intruding into another's copy. For example, line 150 Figure
4.4 character string "scud" (FILECHK$) should be identified
as the required first entry in the password file and should
be different for each copy of the application. To start the
system the administrator should add his/her desired
passwords, nine at most, to the required first entry,
encrypt the file with the desired case sensitive key and the
name "$ED.NMQ" and delete the un-encrypted copy of the
password file.
The application should also include a data file
with one set of test data included to preclude the system
from attempting to decrypt and append to an empty file. A
copy of this original data file should be maintained by the
administrator and used for data housekeeping operations.
The data file, like the password file, needs to be encrypted
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and named in accordance with lines 130 and 70 of Figures 4.7
and 4.4 respectively.
Changing the passwords should be done regularly
in any system and should be easy to accomplish so as not to
discourage changes when needed. To change passwords, run
RCRYPT.COM directly on the $ED.NMQ file and edit the file
with new passwords. The required first entry of the file
should not be changed or the system will reject the new
password file as bogus. Re-encryption of the password file
using a new encryption key is needed. Changing the key each
time passwords are changed maximizes security.
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V. APPLICATION IN A FOURTH GENERATION LANGUAGE ENVIRONMENT
A. ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION
The Relay Race Approach was installed into a previously
implemented DBaselV database application. DBase was chosen
because of its widespread familiarity and its non-procedural
nature. If the approach could be easily grafted into an
existing DBase IV generated application, it would be an
effective approach for securing other existing applications.
Fourth generation languages are often used in
environments where end users build applications. Security
may not be considered when users create applications. The
Relay Race Approach shows promise as an efficient security
measure for these existing end user applications.
The DbaselV application generator allows users or
developers to create fully functional menu driven database
applications with little or no coding. Database structures,
forms, reports and queries are created using user friendly
graphical interfaces and then are combined to work together
by the application generator. The application generator
generates source code with comments which is compiled into
object code that can be run either in the DBase IV
environment or with a run-time module.
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B. APPLICATION DESCRIPTION
The application is the user version of an automated dive
log. It is used for users to enter SCUBA diving events, and
query reports such as logs or qualification reports from the
database. There is another version which accesses the same
database which is used by the system administrator for
marketing and other business and organizational functions.
The application accesses four database files: DIVER. DBF,
SITE. DBF, DIVE. DBF and QUAL . DBF . It uses one data entry
form file, DIVEFORM. SCR. Two query (.QBE) files were
slightly modified for use: J0IN1.PRG and QUALLIST . PRG . Two
report files were built and used: LOG_REPO.FRM and
QUALRPT.FRM. Finally, the application generator created two
program files: DLUSER.PRG and USERBAR.PRG.
Since the Relay Race Approach depends on passing
parameters between programs, the structure of the
application must be understood before the approach can be
installed into an existing application. Since the source
code was 95 percent generated by DbaselV the application
must be reverse engineered, yielding a structure chart
needed for understanding. Figure 5.1 is the structure chart
for the application. Only J0IN1.PRG and QUALLIST. PRG can
access the data, so only procedures which can possibly call









Figure 5.1: Structure Chart of Dive Log
Application
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These are DLUSER and MPDEF in DLUSER.PRG file, ACT03, ACT04
in USERBAR.PRG file, and J0IN1.PRG and QUALLIST.PRG files.
C. TRANSFORMING CONCEPTS TO CODE
1 . Handling Passwords and the Baton
Checking password validity is accomplished first and
the code required for this was inserted into the main
program, DLUSER.PRG. Figure 5.2 shows the additional source
code inserted at the very beginning of the DLUSER.PRG file.
The set color commands ensure that the password is not
echoed to the screen when the user types their' s. In order
to get the prompt "Enter Password" on the screen and not the
password itself, the prompt and the acceptance of the value
for variable "PWORD" had to be separated by the set color
command. This is why the ACCEPT string is a space. Set
color is used again to return the screen to normal. Since
most Dbase IV users will have the capability to compile
programs, the passwords were compiled rather than stored in
an encrypted file. The logic in the IF / ELSE clause is
such that if no password is entered, and the error message
which occurs is "ignored" by the user, the program
VIOLATIO.PRG will be run, not the rest of DLUSER.PRG. Dbase
defaults to the first statement when an error is encountered
in an IF/ELSE clause and the user selects "IGNORE" at the
error prompt. VIOLATIO.PRG displays a violation message and
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terminates the program. If the password is found to be
valid the data files are decrypted. Since the baton in
DBase can be a true parameter instead of a shared variable
as was the case in BASIC, a variable does not need to be
set . When a procedure is called it simply needs to be
called with a value which will be checked by the called
procedure. Figure 5.3 illustrates the correct syntax for
calling programs and procedures with the parameter required.
@3,3 SAY ''Enter Password: "
SET COLOR OF NORMAL TO B/B
ACCEPT " ' ' TO PWORD
SET COLOR OF NORMAL TO W+/B
IF (.NOT. PWORD=" TIGRIS") .AND
.
( .NOT PWORD=" SCUD")
.AND. ( .NOT. PWORD=''BAGDAD")
DO VIOLATIO
ELSE
RUN PKUNZIP ADLDATA -SIRAQ
** Rest of Program **c
Figure 5.2: Code required for password checking in
the main program for the Dive Log application.
** Calling Program or Procedure **
DO MPDEF WITH "GOOD"
** Called Program or Procedure **
PARAMETER BATON
ON ERROR CANCEL
IF .NOT. BATON = "GOOD"
DO VIOLATIO
ELSE
** Rest of Program * *
Figure 5.3: Code required for calling subprograms
and procedures with parameters
.
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2. Called Procedures or Subprograms Requirements
Called subprograms or procedures which receive the
security parameter BATON must contain the PARAMETERS
statement as shown in Figure 5.3. It was discovered during
testing that if an intruder attempted to call a subprogram
or procedure directly without the required parameter, Dbase
displays an error message displaying the (IF .NOT. BATON =
"GOOD") line of source code and a prompt "PARAMETER NOT
FOUND" . This would give the intruder information required
to successfully call the subprogram or procedure on his next
attempt. The "ON ERROR CANCEL" line terminates program
execution when any error occurs to remedy the situation.
The IF/ELSE clause checks for the security baton and runs
the violation procedure or the rest of the program
accordingly
.
3. Data Encryption, Decryption and Administration.
Since the application uses four different data files
the PKZIP/PKUNZIP utility programs were selected for
encryption and decryption of data files. It allows for
compression and encryption of multiple files into one single
file. As depicted in Figure 5.2 the encryption key "IRAQ"
is compiled into the program instead of being prompted from
and entered by the user
.
The procedure ACT05 in the USERBAR.PRG file, (Figure
5.1), is executed to exit the system. Data encryption and
39
residue housekeeping is accomplished here. The required
code is shown in Figure 5 .
4
RUN PKZIP ADLDATA -m -SIRAQ * . DBF
Figure 5.4: Code required for encrypting data files
and removing the decrypted data files
.
The system administrator has only to periodically
recompile the source code changing passwords and encryption
keys. Access to the source code should be limited to
trusted personnel only as it contains information which
would greatly simplify intrusion.
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VI . THE RELAY RACE APPROACH AND LOCAL AREA NETWORK SECURITY
The explosion of personal computers in the workplace has
led to the need for data communication and asset sharing
among an organization's Pes. Local area networks (LANs)
efficiently provide these attributes and are being utilized
extensively today.
A. ELEMENTS AND FUNCTIONALITY OF LANS
LAN implementation includes installing LAN hardware
expansion cards in the computers which are to be linked,
linking the computers together using a cabling system, and
installing a LAN operating system on the machines. One of
the machines is designated as the server and the rest are
clients. The full operating system resides on the server
while only a shell or subset resides on each client. In
popular PC LANs the network operating system still utilizes
MS-DOS but provides added network functions.
Communication between machines or nodes in a network
involves multiple communication protocols. Each protocol
level uses functions provided at lower levels by lower level
protocols
.
B. SECURITY IN LANS
Most LAN operating systems provide security functions
capable of multi-level security of files and physical
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devices. These measures combined with certain physical
security measures involving the network server can protect
assets against casual intrusion attempts. However, if
physical access to the network server can be gained an
intruder could attempt to load a different copy of the
network operating system onto the server and give himself
access to protected files and/or devices. Many LANs place
printers and other periphrials along side the server and the
server therefore cannot be physically isolated from the
users or public.
C. ENHANCING OVERALL LAN SECURITY
Even though network operating systems oftem provide
security features, the Relay Race Approach can significantly
strengthen overall security. The Relay Race Approach
provides efficient security at the application layer
complementing security features implemented at the LAN
operating system layer. For example, if an intruder were
capable of accessing the LAN server, load a different copy
of the LAN operating system and attempt to access a
protected application, additional security provided by the
Relay Race Approach would significantly hamper his attempts.
The additional layer of security would most likely end the
intruder's attempt: at least for that session.
Additionally, combining security measures implemented at the
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LAN operating system layer with those at the application
layer can reduce requirements for "armor plated" physical
security measures such as heavy duty locks, doors or
cabinets for the network server.
Both prototype applications were installed on a LAN.
Both executed as expected and illustrated feasibility of the





Personal computer security is an issue of increasing
importance to computer professionals. It is valuable to
explore efficient methods of providing or enhancing PC
security. The Relay Race Approach provides or enhances
security in the PC environment efficiently. The Approach
can be strengthened using deceptive measures to thwart
intrusions by all but those thoroughly familiar with the
application source code.
A. THE NEED
The increased need for PC security is evident in view of
several recent trends. First, PCs are being used in an
increasing number of different business areas. These
include those areas where sensitive processing is common.
Secondly, more persons are becoming familiar enough with
PC's and MS-DOS to be considered capable of casual intrusion
into marginally protected PC environments. Finally, the
increase in public sensitivity to privacy of information
issues dictates the need for increased security in areas
once thought to be of a non-sensitive nature.
B. REQUIRED ATTRIBUTES
For these reasons an approach with the following
attributes would be of significant value. It should be
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compact, as application program size is of great concern in
the PC environment . The approach should be flexible or
multi-leveled, that is, it should allow public access to
some applications and limit access to other application (s)
to only their specified set of authorized users . The
approach should be easy to implement, even in existing
applications . Increasing end-user application development
makes this a valuable attribute. The Relay Race Approach
exhibits these desired attributes and is strong enough to
withstand casual attacks from intruders with strong
knowledge of MS-DOS and PCs.
C. POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENTS
The relay approach depends on the premise that an
intruder does not have access to the application source code
and knowledge of how the approach was implemented in the
application. There are two modifications which could
enhance security just in case knowledge of the approach
and/or application source code is compromised: unique
application copies and deceptive and dynamic baton
variables. Additionally, disk file residue eliminators
could strengthen security.
1. Unique Application Copies
First, it would be important to make different
copies of the application utilize unique or nearly unique
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password files. This would be accomplished by compiling
many versions of the program, each using a different first
entry in the password file (the password file check
variable) . This would defeat an intruder who might have one
copy of the application and attempt to insert his password
file into another system and using it to gain access to the
other system's data.
2. Deceptive and Dynamic Batons
To further help deceive intruders who might gain
access to the program source code, the "baton" may be
concealed. Suppose in the Basic application the baton
variable were "MINEDIST#" instead of "BATON" and was of type
integer, Figure 4.4. This would slow a potential intruder's
conceptualization as he browses the source code in search of
security hints. Additionally, dynamic batons can be
employed. Such a baton variable can be set to valid
indirectly through one or more intermediate variables which
might appear to be accomplishing some arithmetic operations.
The value given to the baton variable may also change often
but retain some characteristic for the validity check. For
instance, the baton could change value but retain even
divisibility by 17 and the validity check would be designed
to test for that
.
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3. Disk File Residue Eliminators
Finally, using a filewipe type residue eliminating
program instead of simple MS-DOS delete command in the
application would provide an extra degree of security to
counter random disk sector searches.
The Relay Race Approach provides efficient, casual
security for personal computer applications in today's
environment of increasing PC security Threats
.
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Appendix A: Source code for Minefield Planning
Application in BASIC.
1 'MFPLAN.BAS - Prototype 2 4-21-91 of Relay Race Baton PC security system.











9 IF BATON$="VALID" THEN GOTO 140
18 LOCATE 13,10
20 PRINT "Enter your password and press ENTER."
21 LOCATE 15.1
5









27 SHELL "RCRYPT SED.NMQ PWORD.DAT" ' ****DECODE FILE OF VALID
PASSWORDS AND CHECK USER'S FOR VALIDITY
28 OPEN "PWORD.DAT" FOR INPUT AS #1




38 IF PASSWORD$«VALIDPW$(N) THEN FOUNDS-
T
:
40 IF FOUND$-"T" THEN GOTO 60 ELSE GOTO 32
50 IF FOUND$="F" THEN CLS:LOCATE 17,10:PRiNT "Your password is invalid,
access denied."
51 ' ****PAUSE TO
READ MESSAGE
52 LOCATE 19.10:PRINT "Press any key to continue."
54 ASH N KEYS: IF A$="" THEN 54
56 CLOSE 1:KILL "PWORD.DAT* ' ""CLOSE PASSWORD FiLE & ERASE IT
58 GOTO 240 ' ****STOP
60 CLOSE 1: KILL "PWORD.DAT"
62 BATON$-"VALiD n :' ****BU!LD BATON
80CLS
90 LOCATE 5,5:PRiNT "Welcome to Minefield Planning. A simple Basic program to"
100 LOCATE 6.5-.PRINT "assist in planning air deployed minefields Given IP lat"
110 LOCATE 7,5:PRINT "and long, hole lat & long's, track, speed and trajectory"
120 LOCATE 8,5: PRINT "the program will calculate and securely store and/or
"
130 LOCATE 9,5:PRINT "print time to drop and distance to drop."
140 LOCATE 11.10:PRINT "MAIN MENU'"
150 LOCATE 13,5:PRINT "1 - Enter new data and calculate drops"
155 LOCATE 14,5:PRiNT "2 - Retrieve previously stored solution from disk'
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160 LOCATE 15, 5: PRINT "3 - Print data from earlier calculated or retrieved line"
1 65 LOCATE 1 6^5 PRINT "4 - Save current mineline calculations to disk"
1 70 LOCATE 17,5:PRINT "5 - EXIT SYSTEM"
!80 LOCATE 19,10: PRINT "Enter your choice"
I90INPUTCH$
>00 IF CH$="1 " THEN CHAIN "MINECALC" ELSE IF CH$="2" THEN CHAIN
rMLRETREV" ELSE IF CH$="3" THEN CHAIN "MINEPRNT" ELSE IF CH$= n4" THEN
:HAIN "MINESAVE" ELSE IF CH$«"5" THEN GOTO 240
>10CLS




3 OPTION BASE 1
1DIM YTD(10),TTD(10)
3 COMMON





-ILOMXn0).HLO(10).NSD!FF(10) ) EWDiFF(10) l NSYDS(10),EWYDS(10)TOTYDS(10)
*DIMTOTYDSCHK(10)
0CLS
!0 IF BATONS - "VALID'* GOTO 30 ELSE GOTO 1065
\0 cis: LOCATE 2.5: PRINT "Enter Data Below Prompts."
10 LOCATE 4.5:PRiNT "Is !.P. Latitude N or S? (CAP!TALS)":INPUT LAHS
iO LOCATE 5.5:PRINT "Degrees":LOCATE 5,15:PRiNT "Minutes"
I LOCATE 5,25:PRINT "Seconds"
SO LOCATE 6.5.-INPUT IPLAD:LOCATE 6,15
11 IPLADR-IPLAD*3.141593/180
I INPUT IPLAM: LOCATE 6.25:INPUT IPLAS
r LOCATE 8,5:PRINT "is I. P. Longitude E or W? (CAPITALS)*': INPUT LOH$
iO LOCATE 9,5:INPUT IPLOD: LOCATE S,15:1NPUT IPLOM:LOCATE S,25:iNPUT
PLOS
I0 LOCATE 11 ,5
»2 PRINT "Enter true track from LP. to holes in 3 digits(001-360). M
I4 INPUT TRK
>5 TRKR-TRK*3.1 41 593/1 80
00 LOCATE 13,5:PRINT "Enter groundspeed in knots.MNPUT SPD
10 LOCATE 14,5
12 PRINT "Enter weapon trajectory in yards for your speed and altitude (from
"ACREFMAN)."
14 INPUT TRAJ
20 LOCATE 18,5:PRiNT "Enter number of mines in this line.": IN PUT N
21 CLS
30 IPLAMX - IPLAM + (IPLAS/60)
31 IPLA - IPLAD + (IPLAMX/60)
32 IPLOMX - IPLOM - (IPLOS/60)
33 IPLO - IPLOD + (IPLOMX/60)
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134 IF (LAH$="N") AND (LOH$="W") GOTO 140 ELSE GOTO 372
140 FOR I- 1 toN
150 LOCATE 2,20:PRINT "Hole ";i
160 LOCATE 3,5




172 LOCATE B ,27: IN PUT HLAS(I)
173 LOCATE B,44:INPUT HLOD(I)
174 LOCATE B,50:INPUT HLOM(I)
175 LOCATE B,56:INPUT HLOS(I)
250 HLAMX(I) - HLAM(!) + (HLAS(!)/60)
260 HLA(l)-HLAD(l) + (HLAMX(l)/60)
270 HLOMX(I) = HLOM(i) + (HLOS(I)/60)
280 HLO(I) - HLOD(I) + (HLOMX(!)/60)
290 NSDIFF(i) - HLA(I) - IPLA
300 EWDIFF(I) = IPLO - HLO(I)
310 NSYDS(I)-NSDIFF(I)*2020*60
320 EWYDS(i) - EWDIFF(i) * 2020 * 60 * COS(IPLADR)
325 IF ((TRK>S5)AND(TRK<95))OR((TRK>265)AND(TRK<275))THEN 340
330 TOTYDS(I) » (NSYDS(l))/(COS(TRKR))
335 GOTO 350
340 TOTYDS(I) - (EWYDS(I))/(SIN(TRKR))
350 YTD(I) - TOTYDSii) - TRAJ
360 TTD(l') - ((((YTD(!)/2020)/SPD)* 60)* 60)
370 NEXT I
371 GOTO 820




830 LOCATE 2,2:PRINT "IP"
831 LOCATE 2,1 7: PR! NT "Track"
832 LOCATE 2,25:PRINT "Speed"
833 LOCATE 2,33: PR! NT "Yards to drop"
834 LOCATE 2,49:PRINT "Time to drop"
840 LOCATE 4,2:PRINT LAH$
841 LOCATE 4,4: PR INT IPLAD
842 LOCATE 4,7:PRINT IPLAM
843 LOCATE 4,10:PRINT IPLAS
844 LOCATE 4,1 7:PRINT TRK
845 LOCATE 4,25:PRINT SPD
846 locate 5,2: print LOH$
847 locate 5,4: print IPLOD
848 locate 5,8: print IPLOM
849 locate 5,11:print IPLOS
850 FOR K - 1 to N
860 L - 3 + K




90 LOCATE 1 8,1 0:PRINT "Press any key to continue."
DO B$HNKEY$:IF B$="" THEN 900
10 CHAIN "MFPLAN"
365 cls:locate 10,10:print "Security Violation, Access Denied.'
366 locate 11 ,10: print "press any key to continue."
367 z$=inkey$:if z$="" then 1067
370cls:END







IF BATON$»"VALID" GOTO 40 ELSE GOTO 250
OLPRINT"":LPRINT HH
5 LPRINT ,."UNCLASS!FIED":LPRINT "
"









30 LPRiNT "True Track: " TRK Aircraft Groundspeed: " SPD
10 LPRINT""
15 LPRiNT "Hole r.'Time to Drop:YDistance to Drop:"
17 LPRINT ."(sec-ondsVV'Cyards)"






50 CLS:LOCATE 10,10:PR!NT "Security Violation, Access Denied."
50 LOCATE 11,10:PRINT "press any key to continue'










) IF BATON$-"VALID" THEN GOTO 40 ELSE GOTO 140
I CLS
I LOCATE 2,2: PRINT "When this program stores a file it does not store the"
3 locate 3,2:print "trajectory or the hole lat/long. Therefore no classified"
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24 locate 4,2: print "data is stored or can be derived from the file as long as"
25 locate 5,2: print "the minefield is an exercise field and not a real operational one."
26 LOCATE 7,5: PRINT "Do you wish to store this data in the file? (y or n) n
27 INPUT AN$
28 IF AN$~"Y" OR AN$-"y" GOTO 40 ELSE IF AN$="N" OR AN$«"n" GOTO 130 ELSE
GOTO 31
31 LOCATE 10,5:PRINT "Error choose y or n."
32 LOCATE 12,5:PRINT "Press any key to continue."
33 B$-INKEY$:IF B$=" w THEN 33
34 GOTO 21
40 LOCATE 5,5: PRINT "What name would you like to store the data under?"
45 locate 6,8: print "(all lower case and remember it please)"
50 INPUT NA$
60 SHELL "RCRYPT $ED.MNQ MINE.DAT"












100 SHELL "RCRYPT MiNE.DAT SED.MNQ"
110 KILL "MINE.DAT"
130 CHAIN "MFPLAN"
140 CLS:LOCATE 10,10:PRINT "Security Violation, access denied."
150 LOCATE 11, 10: PR INT "Press any key to continue."
160 p$~inkey$:if p$«"" then 160
170CLS:END
1 'MLRETREV.BAS






30 IF BATON$="VALID" THEN GOTO 40 ELSE GOTO 160
40 LOCATE 5,5:PRINT "Enter the name you stored desired data under, (lower case
please)"
50 INPUT NM$
60 SHELL "RCRYPT $ED.MNQ MINE.DAT"
70 OPEN "MINE.DAT" FOR INPUT AS #3
80 IF EOF(3) THEN CLOSE #3:PRINT " NOT FOUND":KILL "MINE.DATn:GOTO 150
90 INPUT #3 NA$









130 CLOSE #3:KILL "MINE.DAT"
150 CHAIN "MFPLAN"
160 CLS: LOCATE 10,10: PRINT "Security Violation, access denied."
52
70 LOCATE 11, 10: PR INT "Press any key to continue.




Source code for Dive Log Application in Dbase IV
*****************************************
* Program : DLUSER.PRG
* Author : This is an APPLICATION OBJECT.
*Dale : 8-04-91
* Notice : Type information here or greetings to your users.
* dBASE Ver....: See Application menu to use as sign-on banner.
* Generated by.: APGEN version 1.3
* Description..: user application of dive log database.
* Description..: Main routine for menu system
**********************************************************************
* ADDED CODE FOR SECURITY MODULE
S3,3 SAY "Enter Password: "
SET COLOR OF NORMAL TO B/B
ACCEPT " " TO PWORD
SET COLOR OF NORMAL TO W+/B

















IF gn_ ApGen > 4





PRIVATE gc_bell, ge_carry, gc_clock, gc_cenlury, gc_confirm, gc_deli,;
gc_safety, gc_status, gc_score, gc_talk, gc_kcy, gc_prognum,;
gc_quit, gc_color. gc_display, glcolor, glbatch, gn_scrsize
ENDIF
*— Store some sets to variables
gc_bell =SET("BELL")
54
:_ca r ry =SE T !"CA-' :
Clock =SET("CLOCK'











_sa-fety =SET(' :ft r ETV K )
"status =SET( " STATUS !'j
_score =SE T ('SC0REF0AR[
"talk =SET('TALn
F CONSOLE ON
gc_displav B EEA2< B
p_errcr=0
ON ERROR ??

















i MESSAGE TO tB
r PRINT OFF
I RERR00ES5 TO 4
r SAFETY 1 k
I TALK OFF
- Initialize global variables
44 is a batch c;er jtion in -repress
.AND. SET("DISFLAY E ) "CBAMDNQ"
44 if m etc, otherwise an e^ror occurred
4! keypress returned fro? the IN<EY() function
44 number of lines or, screen
44 return value frca popup of position eenus
4* sets trace level, however you need to change teiplate
44 bcrde r to use when drawing bores
44 Device to use fo r printing - See Pro:. PrintSet
44 leave the application
44 internal program counter to handle nested lienus
44 sesvar for return tc caller















t— reitove aste r :sk to tu r " c'.::> :-.
> SET CLOCK TC







DO MPDEF KITH "SODD" U execute Me-u Process DEFir.ition
iiniuimtmmi
t~ Execute ram senu
DO WHILE gcjey = 'H'
!llll!ll!ll!Unii!i
DO USERBAR WITH "BOO* "BOOB*
tjiii'iJinniMinn
IF c:_cu:t = '0'
EX IT
ENDIF
AC T IVATE WINDOW Exit_fipr
ic_ccr < =SE T ;
t CONFIR M )






-m want tc leave this application?" ;
SET gcj.sy PICT f : h VA.ID gcjey J "NY"
READ
SET CONFIRM 'Hz conf,
SE T DELIMITER * f= _d e 1 1
.



















n Apcen '' i






SET PEESA3E TC ""
CLEAR
DEFINE WINDOW Saves:-- C R0* 0,0 TO gn_oidsize,79 *-0NE
DEFINE WINDOW He]?s:r FROM 0,0 T qr _c 1 dr : ze ,79 NCNE





lesfipticn..: procedure files 'cr generated se:u systes.
he programs that folio* a r e cosson to sa: r re. tines







ON ERROR DO Mulierr


















I— 6et the uee r selection I stce BAR irt: variable






















































- Parameters : Ic ssc = ressjce i: n.e











IF TY^ETlc_sessa:e B j =V
§ (,1 SAY [An errcr has cccu r rec
ELSE





















- Dial oq box 'or options Try again and Return t;
ic_ernc $ '106, 109, 122,129,-''
ACTIVATE WINDOW Pause
§02 SAY k erno*" B +riESSA8E! j
£ 2,22 SAY
!!
T = Try again, F = Return to re-.,
CURE •".'- VALID lc_opt $ "TR 5
READ
DEACT1VA T E HINDCN Pause




- Display sessag? and return to senu.
'
.NOT. lc_erno $ '108,109,128,129,"












Desc: Trace prccec:rc - tc let prograaser know Khat sodule
is about to execute and what Bodule has executes.
ARAMETERS ?_isg, pjvl
--
^araseters : p_?:C, - sessape line, p_l y l = trace \evsl
c_ffisg = pjssg
n_iv: = pjvl







DE'INE WINDOW trace FR™ 5,0 TO 16,7? DClElE
ACT!VA T E HINDOK trace
DC NHILE k_trp O 'Q'
CLEAR
§ 2,4C-LEN'.Ic_isg}/2 SAY k_ssg
§ 4,05 SAY '5 - Set trace level, B - Display status, 1 - display Memory'
& 5,05 SAY 'P - Turn printer en, G - tc Suit'
!c tr r =
'Q'
§ 5, 35 EET ic_trp FIC T URE
READ
DC CASE
CASE lc_trp = 'S'
* 2,01 LL.EAR
6 2,33 SAY 'Set trace Ie>e!'








acc- is nos turned off. .To reactivate lr zz rz - ;t=ss rF3-i




ON >EY LAEEL F3 3 r t r a~e - 1
EN2I C
CASE !:_trp = 'D'
DISPLAY STATUS
WAIT
CASE Icjrp = '«'
DISPLAY HEH0RY
WAIT
















FINE ODD* printei; FRD« 03,25 TC 17, *i
FINE POPUP SavePrin FRC!- 10,40
^IKE BA- 1 D c BavePrir FED*- 7 K Bend output to ..." S*'I C
'INE BAR 2 OF SavePrin PROMPT REPLlCATE(CH c;'.ir6),24) S*:
: INE BAR 3 OF SavePrin PROMPT fc CCS': Console* KESSA5E "Sena output to Sere;
: INE BAR 4 OF SavePrir PRD!* : T " lP t 1: Ra'siie: port 1 " *ESSASE "Send outoui
f * , e
: INE BAR 5 C BaveFrin PRC^FT l L^'TI: Parallel por: 1 : HESEAEE "Send output
J2:"
INE B^ ; 6 DF Save 1 "- !" F ^ C; P ^ T L CufU: Se r ial zcr'. 1" riESSAEE ;"Esr,i outrut t:
: INE BAR 7 >~ Sav?"'ir PRO*" " FILE = F.EFCRT . T i'T k KESSASE 'Bene output to
ie Report.txt"
SELECTION POPUP EaveRri- DO qei_sele






t Alternate t d report .txt
se^ alternate on
|£
IF .NO*, (gn send - 3 .OR. LA£TKEt'{ } = 27]
nr rjoy = ' ppfe
'
tsar = SiiPCTP/" IPTUPfyrnm ! •'-- eonrt-'/i-nti £*
ON ERROR DO prntrtry
SET F.RINTER TO Jttesp.




















fi 1,0 SAY "Please ready your printer or
1
8 2,0 SAY
B press Est to canceJ
DO WHILE ( .NCI. PRINTSTATUS(I) .AND. grjksy 27
gn_pkey = INKEYO
ENDDO
DEACTIVA T E NINDDH printeep
SET ESCAPE fclcjescaoe.







IF LEN!DPF( ) } -






T DELIMITERS r F
in_tyge=0 $1 suclevsl selectic-
ln-_rkey=F:EA:'t;EY( ; IJ test for ESC or Return
] p rpr rPPT fc)P [ 1 ?.i !*' p T r c r p r H P'-s^c"-
In fjinsO tl f nr ir' * — ? n LJfibDp
lc_dats=DATE!) to for input of a date
l:_optiG- = '0' y sain c-ptior is. Seek, Goto ard L::ate
»-- Score le. ALL, REST, NEXT (n>
S T CRE SPACE i 10 ; Tj I: set
»-- 1 = Cha'acte- SEEK , 2 = For clause, 3 = Hhile cla.se
STORE SPACE(40) TC lcjnl, lc_ln2, lc_ir3
Ic_tesp="
§ 0,00 SAY "Index order: H + I CF{ »
E
=CRDER(
; /Database is in natural o-dsr'
% 1,00 SAY "Listed below are the first It fields."
lc_teup=REPLICATE!CHR;i9i),19)
e 2,0 SAY :HR(218)+lcjB8p+CHR(l?4)+k_teBp+CKR(174)+lc_tesp+CHR{l?4)+li
ln_nua=240
DO WHILE Injiui < 560
le_tesp=FIELD[ (ln_nus-240;/20 +1!
§ (In_nui/80},B0D(!n_nus,80] SAY CHR{179)+;
lc_tssp+SPACE(ll-LEMlc_teso!) +
;








FINE POPUP Positl FROM 6,30
FINE EAR 1 OF Positl PROMPT " Position by " SKIP
FINE BAR 2 DF Positl PROMPT RE c'u]CATE;CH;!9:) ,1?) 5f,I &
FINE BAR 3 DF Positl PROMPT " SEEK Record" MESSAGE








FINE BAR 4 OF Positl pR0f- T c 0D 7 Record" MESSAGE "Position to specific rszori'
FINE BAR 5 OF Positl PROMPT " LOCATE Recc-d ' MESSAGE D Lc:ate reco-d for
edition"
FINE BAR 6 OF Posit! PROMPT " Return" MESSAGE 'Return without positioning 1




Ic_option = ]tn?;st r {g^_5er;^;i ii for popup








IF LEN(«DX{1))=0 . C ND. LEN'.MDXd J1=0




DEFINE UNDO* Pos:t2 r R0r1 5 ( 1 5 TO lt.il DC. SUE
ACTIVATE WINDOW Posit!
§ 1,1 SAY "Enter the type of erpression:" GE T lnjyps P ICT "i" RANGE 1,3
£ 2,1 SAY








6 3,1 SAY "Enter the key expression to searcn for:"
IF ln_type=3
H 4.1 BET ldjate PICT "§0"
ELSE
IF ln_type=2
& 4,1 SE T ln_nue PICT 'ItttHH**'
ELSE








IF .NOT. (READKE*!) = 12 ,CR. READKEYO = 26B)








DEFINE POPU c PD5it2 FRD* 5,3C
DEFINE EAR i O r PcsitZ FR0H p T E BCTD: B SKIP
DEFINE FAR 2 DF Pds:12 PROMPT REPLICATE(CHR(196),1C) SKIP
DEFINE BAR 3 OF Posit2 PRO*" " TC pfc MESSAGE "GOTO Tor. of File"
DEFINE BAR 4 C f Po'sit2 PROMPT
B
BOTTOM' MESSAGE "BDTD Bottos of F:!?'
!
DEFINE BAR 5 OF Posit2 PROMPT 5 Record ft MESSA3E "6CT0 A Specific Re:=rd D
ON SELECTION PCRUF Posit2 DC qet_se:e
ACTIVATE POPUP posii2
In ^vr»c - nr; ccnH
IF LASTKEV( ) <} 27
IF In_tyre=f
nFciwc UTNTtnu Pr.c"*" pcnu p ?a *n n t|,> nnnci c
ACTIVATE WINDOW Pos:t2
1~ nua=0
§ 3,1 SA V "Hex, Recce I = ' tLTR! a [STRiRECCCL'i T ! ) )
)
r






















DEFINE WINDOW Pos:t2 FROM B,16 TO 14,66 DOUBLE
ACTIVATE WINDOW Pcsit2
§ 1,19 SPY "ie. ALL, NEXT <n>, and REST'
% 1,01 SAY 'Scope:
8
BET lc_scp
§ 2,01 SAY "For:
r
BET lc_ln2




IF .NOT. (READKEYO = 12 .OR. READKEYO = 268)
lc_teap=TRIH(k_5cp)


















DO PausE KITH "Record net found."
GOTO in_rsc
ENDr





T DELIMITERS 4;: cell.
T CONFIRM r F
TURu
sac I- •, *•
ELF: Pdsi tic1
DC EDURE Pe*Ac t

















FINE KINDOH Tespheip FROM 3,12 TO 19.67
TIVATE NINDOk' Tesphelp
CASE





Evaluates a specified expression and attempts to"
' find its value in the taster index of the database'
" file. Returns a logical true (J.) if the index"
fc5
7 " key is f aund , and a logical false (,F.) if it is"
? " net found."
? " Ex: SEEK CT0DC11/03/B7') - converts the"
expression free cha r actsr to cats anc !i
? " then searches for the value in the mde"*




E0/60T0 B0TTDM/ T L'F [IN (alias)]"
7 " or"
?




7 " (record nuaber>°
7 " Positions the reccd nointer to a "ec^f'^d r eco r ""
7 " or location in the active database file."
TOP sieves the pointer to the first record 1
BOTTOM ffoves the pointer to the last record"
7
7 h E"t 4 ~ eove- the rec pr d pointer to r = c^rc 4 y
9
CASE "LOCATE* i PROMPT ()
*-- HELP LOCATE
7 " LOCATE FOR (condition^ [(scope)]"
7 " [WHILE (condition)]"
7 " Searches the active database file, sequentially,"
n
" for the first rszori that Bests the specified"
*
criteria. The function FOUND!) returns true (.1.)"
7 " if LOCATE is successful,''
7 " Ex: LOCATE FOR Age = '25' NEXT 5*
searches for the nex* five record 1
7 containing 25 in the Age field"
CASE "Return' $ PROMPT (J
? " Return to action in p-ogress, with or without*
7 " positioning the record pointer."
ENDCASE








t C0L0R( (expO )
66




a variable Kit" a!: color? store ir it
Ver: dB^SE i.i
The COLOR! ) function either r 3
1
l; r r 5 Dr sets colors returned with the
SET! "attribute" J setting
1* <expC> is a color string then null is returned otherwise the color
setting is returned 'or one of dBASE's color options
See Also: SETfattribute":
RASTERS sst_color
IVATE colorjiua, colcr_str, cnt
t_colcr = UPPER!set_coior;
set_color = "COLDR"
\- Return standard, erna-ceo, border oclc r s o-iy
RE T URN SUEETR(SET!'att' E ,,l, AT l\ SE T ;-a:t rE ) )
)
:if
Declare array to cars? color c;t:o"s ' r os EET( a 3ttr H )
IVATE co!cr_
ILA^E color_[B]
Detertine if use r is resto r irq colors vs. saving colors
1
I" i set_coicr










1 i • 2 C
- Stuff array witn individual co:c r sett:
lcr_str = STUFF (ccl:r_str, f- T '/ &' , co.cr
t ="l
WHILE cnt \- 8
:olo r st? JBSTR-col! 1 h
, 1 « st r ) +1 !
felorjcnt] = EUBS T R!ccio'_str, 1, A T ; F ,\ cclor_str ; - 1)




COLOR OF NORMAL TO fcolorjl].
COLOR F HIEHL16HT TO lcolorJ2].
COLOR OF MESSAGES TO lcolor_[4],
COLOR OF TITLES 7 kolorJS].
COLOR OF BCX TO kolorji],
COLOR CF INFORMATION TO icolor_[7],
COLOR OF FIELDS TO icolor [BJ.
Ji Eo'Se' color
67
I-- Return coic r stnnq requested




CASE 5et_coior $ "HIBHLIBHT"
:olor_nui = 2
CASE set color $ "BORDER
color nu? = T,
CASE 5St_colcr $ 'MESSAGES"
colcr_nus = L
CASE set_color $ "TITLES*
cclcrjiu? = 5
CASE spt_color $ "EOS'
colorjtus = 6










RETURN IIP;" I" $ set color, ", color [COlC!
UUinniUIUUttMtttTUtititMtttttUttttUlMttUtfMtinttritlM
J p ro5ras : MFDEF
Th:s is 3- APPLICATION OBJECT.
3-04-91








Qpc frjr: ' i - j* ' nn ssi'? tr !|cp ac eir.n-np
A^SEN ye r sion 1.3
user application of dive log database.
>annsr.














SET COLOR OF NORMA^ TO K+/B
SET COLOR OF MESSAGES TO W*/N
SET COLOR OP TITLES TO H/B
SET COLOR OF HISHLI6HT TO RB+/SB
SET COLOR OF BOX TO RG+/GB
SET COLOR OF INFORMATION TO E/W
fcB





M TO 16.69 DOUBLE COLOR RB+/BE
MO SAY » t t 1 hfE^CO^E TO AUTOMATED DIVE L3S VERSION i.i t i V
?,10 BAY " This user application allows fcr entering dives, fins'-*
10,10 SAY " ing dive legs fo r printing cr bronzing, and finding and'
11,10 SAY ' printing of qualification lists. Security of inforsa- 1
12,10 SAY " tier is ensured if use r s keep their diver number se:u r e. s
13,10 SAY " You Bust knor your diver number to acccaplish any of the
r
.4,10 SA V ' systeas functions. Than* you fc using AOL 1.1!"
i,10 FILL TO 15,68 COLOR h* ; N





Prevents clearing o 4 menus * r D~ co"a"ds:
SET STATUS and SET SCCREB0AR2
"INE WINDOW FullEcr FRO" 0,0 TO 24,7? NONE
Position at runtiae and bate*" process
INE KINDOk Savescr FROM 0,( TO 21.79 NONE
Fl Help
INE WINDOW Helpscr FRO"! 0,0 TO 21.77 NONE
gn_AoEe-=l
I— A r ? you sure'' (exit application)
DEFINE WINDOW E;'it_App FRO* 11,17 TO 15,62 DOUBLE
t-- Pause message bo:-:





' BORDER TO DOUBLE
Bar
: INE MENU UBEREAR MESSA6E 'Select a- option with the arrow keys and push
tR."
: INE PAD PAD_1 OF USERBAR PRDHPT "Dive" AT 1.1
SELECTION PAL PAD_1 OF USERBAR DO ACT01
r INE PAD PAL_2 OF USERBAR PROMPT "Lop/ AT 1.10
SELECTION PAD PAD_2 OF USERBAR DO ACT01
: INE PAD PAD_3 OF USERBAR PROMPT "duals' AT 1,18
SELECTION PAD PAD_3 OF USERBAR DC ACT01
: INE PAD PADJ OF USERBAR PROMPT "Exit" A 7 1.2B
SELECTION PAD PADJ OF USERBAR DO ACTOl
l
' BORDER TO DOUBLE
69
$-- Popup
DEFINE POFUF DIVE FROM I,! TC 4,17 ;
MESSAEE "Press ENTER tc continue/enter -: dive or el?e --> (arrow key)'
DEFINE BAR 1 DF DIVE PRDHPT 'Enter 3 dive
1
CN SELECTION POPUP DIVE DO flCTC2
SET BORDER TC DOUBLE
J~ Pomp
DEFINE POPUP LOB FROM 2,10 TO 6,29 ;
MESSASE "Choose an option ait*- a"ow keys and push RETURN or el =? use
DEFINE BAP 1 0^ LOB PROMPT "Find a icq ,;
DEFINE BAR 2 OF LOB PROMPT "B-oxze found ice'
DEFINE BAR 3 OF LG3 PROMPT "Print *oun; leg
1
uimutm
ON SELECTION P0 :'UP LOS DO ACT03 W! TU "E0DD !
Ujiiiunni
77 » '
BET BORDER TO DOUBLE
t- Popup
DEFINE POPUP DUAL FROM 2,18 TO 5,42 j
MESSAEE "Use arros keys tc select an option and press RETURN c-r e;se
DEFINE BA C 1 0? DUAL PROMPT "Find a qua! list"
DEFINE BAR 2 OF GU^L PROMPT
,}
P^:r;t *:und qua! list*
tmutmtt
ON SELECTION POPUP DUAL DO ACT04 &I T H "SOOU"
tuitttntn
(a r rcn key!
iarro* keys;
SET BORDER TO DOUBLE
»-- Popup
DEFINE POPUP EXIT FRC!" 2,2E TO 4,« c ;
MESSAEE 'Position: ' +CHR f 27 ) -^-CHR ( 2fc ; +CHR ' 25 ) +CHR : 24
1
+ Sele:::
-rCHR( 17}-rCHRU9fc ?*ChRi217)*' Help: Fi'
DE'INE EAR 1 OF EX! T PROMPT "Return to DBASE IV"













ON KEY LABEL Fi




§ 0,0 CLEAR TC 21,79









- help for senj USERBAR
!SE "USERBAR" = Ic popsenu
« 2,2 SAY "No Help defined."
- help for genu DIVE
ISE "DIVE" = lcjtopsenu
§ 2,2 SAY "N: Help defined/
- help for eenL LOS
iSE "LOS" = icjepsenu
§ 2.2 SAY 'N: Help de'ir,ed.
E
- help for ee.ni. QUAL
iSE "QUAL" = !:_pop£?nu
§ 2,2 SAY
fi
Nc Help defined. 8
~ !" e 1 r for e e n u E J( r
SE "EH*" = lcjtopienu
t 2,2 SAY »He Help defined.
1
HERSISE





ACT!VA T E NINDCfc Helps-
KEY LABEl Fl DC iHELPi
TURN











This is ar APPLICATION DEJECT.
B-C4-9I
Type inforeaticn here or greetings to your use's,
See Application eenu to use as sipn-on banner.
APEEN version 1.3
FIRST MENU LEVEL IN USER APPLICATION.

















t— Before ser,u cede
ACTIVATE RENU USERBAR





ON KEY LABEL Fl DO 1HELF1
DO DBF01 kk cper senu level database
IF qn_errcr =









CHR(35! +CHR!3S^ B H*/N,H/B,R6+/6B,B/il,W5B"
BET CO_OR CF NORMAL TC **/E
SET COLOR OF MESSAGES TO K+/N
SET COLOR OF TITLE: TD W/B
SET COLOR OR HIS^LISHT TO R6+/6B
.
SET COLOR OF BOX TO RS+/SB
SET COLOR OR INFORMATION TO B/H
SET COLOR 0' FIELDS TO N/'GE
END1F
SE T BORDER TO
6 CO TO 2,79 DCJBLE COLOR RS*/GB
6 1,1 CLEAR TO 1,78
% 1,1 FILL TO 1,78 COLOR H+/N
I 1,1 SAY "Dive COLOR S+/N
I 1,10 SAY Teg" COLOR N+/N
6 1,18 SAY "Duals' COLOR H+/N





t— Open ser.u level viem/datahase
k_fessaQe="0"






DC Pause WITH ;








- Begin USER3AR: BAR Henu Actions.
(befo r = ites, action, ana alter ites]




IE "PAD_i" = FA:.;
k_neit='Y'
DC DIVE KITH " 01"




]'t "rfilj 1 -- FA:;!
lc_neK='¥'
4/W kiwi It. " 1 '- *













IF LEFT(entryflQ,l! - "B"
DEACTIVATE HENU
ELSE

















This is an AMPLICATION DEJECT.
B-04-91
Type inforeation here or greetings to your users.
See Application aenu to use as sig.i-cn banner.
APBEN version 1.3
iJ5e r popup for entering a dive,


















ON KEY LABEL r l DC 1HELF1
DQ DBF02 M open ienu level database
IF gn_error =










SET COLOR OF NCRHAL TO K+/B
SET COLOR OF MESSAGES TO H+/N
SET COLOR OF TITLES TO M/E
SET COLOR OF HIGHLIGHT TO R&t/GE
SET COLOR OF BOX TO RB+/6B
SET COLOR OF INFORMATION TO B/K







- Cpen iensj level view/database
_t&Esa;e-"















- Bec:n DIVE: F'QPL* "en: Actiors.








BE BAR; ) = 1




Jbi . . - - w : w
1-- Dssc : attact fD'-£ 4 ':^ DIVEFOF.fi
SET FORMAT TO DIVEFCW
APPEND
cicse i u-r k<
SET FORMAT TO







IF LEFT(entryflg,i) = "b r
DEACTIVATE MENU
ELSE




z net tc affect REhI's
75





t Procras : LOS. PRE
I Author : T hl c j s a:, ftppLICftTIDN OrJEL T .
I Date : 8-04-91
t Notice : Type indorsation rere Dr greetings to your use r s.
} dBASE Ver....: See Application ser.u tc use as sign-on tanner.
I Generated by.: A p SEN version 1.3
t Description..: Leg popup m user application of dive lot;








1 i y : :_g r I U I / V










OS KEY LAEEL Fl DO 1HELP!
DC DBF03 &t open ser.u level database
IF gn_error =
IF g]_cc]cr .AND. .NOT. SET; "ATTRIBUTE') = "N+/B,R6+/5B,N/N ' + ;
CHR(3B)+CHR(3E)* a H+/N , W/B , R6+/B9 ,B/N,N/EB"
SET COLOR OF NORMAL 70 N+/E
SET COLOR OF MESSAGES TO N+/N
SET COLOR OF TITLES TO H/B
SET COLOR OF HIGHLISHT TO R6+/EB
SET COLOR OF BOX TO R6+/6B
SET COLOR OF INFORMATION TO B/H







Open ienu level view/database
essage='0"










DC Pause WITH ;







CEDUEE AC T 03
Begin LCE: PDPUP Hem fictions,
(before itef, action, and a'ter iteej
iinnimnni
A*ETER BATCN
.NOT. BATDN= K SODD"
D VIOLATIC
niuniuuitin


















IE BAR() = 2
I— Open Ites level view/database and indexes
77

























REPORT FDR" L0E_RE p PLAIN
WAIT
IF .NC T . gljatch
DO AftAct
ENDIF
CASE EAR!) = 3








IF qr_e'rcr ; C
















REPORT FORK LOG_REPG PLAIN NILJE:*






9C_qui t= ' G
'
IF LEFT(entryflg,i! = "B"
DEACTIVATE MENU
ELSE




kJile=''SET !' + [;;_nr D 5r lJ u
DO Hcjile.
D!F















Ben8'3 1 sc! Py
Descr; cticn .
GUfi.. c f:C
This is an AFFLICTION DEJECT.
3-04-9!
Type inforsatior her? c< r g r epti"s to your users.
See Application senu to use as sign-on tanner.
APSEN version 1 .3
Qual pond: for uss r application for C:ye log.












- Before senu code
^9
ACTIVATE POPUP GSJAl




ON KEY LABEL Fl DC IHElF!
DC 05^04 ii cce: as-.u level database
IF gn_error =
IF~q!_color .AND. .NOT. SET' 'ATTRIBUTE*; =
, N+/P,RS+/6B,N/N "+;
CHR ( 32 ) +CHR ' 3S *
u W+/0/B,RE*/6B,B/W,N/6B !
SET COLOR Of NDFHA. TO H+/B
SET COLOR OF MESSAGES TO K + /N
SET COLOR OF TITlEE TO H/B
SE T COLOR O c HISHLISHT TO F3t/0P
SET COLOR CF PCX TO R6+/6E
SET COLOR O r !NFORMA T ION T B/N






t— Open senti level view/databasE
lc_6e£eage- ! 0"















*-- Begin QUAL: POPUP Menu fictions.


























jE PAR;) = 2









DO Pause WI T r ;
"Error opening TE*5F:.DBF
5n_erro r -0




















5E T KESSAEE TO
IF gc_quit='9'
IF LEFTient-yflg,:; = "B"
DEACTIVATE hLNU
ELSE















tnttttt tttuut nut tutu tut tutu tutu tnun tttnun tuututu









This is an APPLICATION DEJECT.
5-04-91
Type infcre-ation he r e or greetings to your user;
See Application aenu to use as sign-on tanner.
AP SEN version 1.3


















i KEY LABEL Fl DO 1HELP1
! DBF05 U open senu level database
: gn_error =
IF Ql_color .AND. .NOT. SET r ATTF.IEjTE k ) = "«*/5,RB+/BE,N ' r +;
CHR(3E)+CHR;3B) + f H-f-/N,U/B
>
RB+/6B,B/ii,N/SB >l
SET COLOR OF NORMAL TO W+/B
SET COLOR OF MESSAGES TO «vK
SET COLOR O c TITLES T U/E
SE T COLOR Q c HIGHLIGHT TO R5<76B
SET COlOR D r BOX TO RS+/6E










-- Open 5c"u level viefc/database
:jie5sage=*O n





en e r r c n )
DO Pause sITH ;
p








- Begin EXIT: POPUP Henu Actions.






JN pkzip adldata -a -sIRAO t.dtf
llltlttllltlt
3 CASE
}SE BAR!) = 1















F LEFT(entryflg,lJ = , B"
DEACTIVATE HENU
ELSE










t- Nase : DIVEFORH.FHT
I- Date : 3-04-?:
I- Version.. ..: dBASE IV, Forsat i.l
t-- Notes : Forsat files use " ss delimiters:
mmmmnmitmmmmtmmmmmmmtmmmmmmttttt
m
t— Forsat file initialization coo's
$— Soffie of these PRIVATE variables &rs created based on CodeBen and nay not
I— ce used by your particular .1st file
PRIVATE lc_talk, lc_curscr, lc_display, ic_status, lc_carrv, lcji'roc,;
ln_typeahd, gc_cut






lc_cursor = SET ('CURSOR")
SET CURSOR ON
lc_status = SET ('STATUS 8 )
t— SET STATUS was ON when you went into the Fores Designer.




-e SAY BETS Processing.
- Forest Page: 1
0,3 TO £,56 DQUP.E
2,6 SAY "Dive data entry fors"




E diver I.D. number (SSN ;
:°
9,36 BET Diverjvua PICTURE B ?99-?9-?? c 9
°
10,8 SAv "date of d:ve:
B
10,30 BET Date
11,6 SAY "serial (nth dive of the day): 1
11,38 6ET Sena: PICTURE "9"
12, 8 SAY "day or right:
1
12,38 BET Nitejay PICTURE "XXXXX"
12,44 SAY "dive"
13,8 SAY "fresh cr sa:t:
c
13,38 BET Fresh_salt PICTURE "UUV
13,44 SAY "Kate-
11
14,8 SAY "water teserature:"
14,38 BET Tesce'atur PICTURE
f 99"
14.41 SAY "deorees F"
15,8 SAY "saxisui depth of dive:"
15,36 SET Depth PICTURE "999"
15.42 SAY "feet"
16,8 SAY "average u/w visibility:"
16,38 BET visibility PICTURE '999"
16,42 SAY "feet"
17,6 SAY "asount of air consused:"
17,36 BET Air used PICTURE °9999 !
17 d^ CiV u n--
»
16,6 SAY 'total dive ti^e: u





- Forpat Page: 2
0,2 SAY "Does the site you dived at have a systea site r.uaber? {(
1,4 SAY "printout] If it dees, enter it here:"
1,42 BET Site_n.i PICTURE "999"
1,47 SAY "If not, describe the site in the"
2,4 SAY "nest data field, dive resarks."
4,2 SA V "dive remarks:"















t— Forest tile exit cods
t— SET STATUS was ON when you Kent into the Foras Designs
I
r kjtatus = "DFF" l( Entered fee nith status of 4






$ dBASE IV . :'RE file
t J0INi. DR5 (joins dive.dbf sitr dive'.-: 4
















USE DIVE. DBF AGAIN N0UFDA7E
USE DIVER. DBF AGAIN NOJPOATE IN 2 ORDER DIVER_NU«
USE SITE. DBF AGAIN NOUPDATE IN 3 ORDER SITE_NLr!
SET EXACT ON
SET FILTER TO ( (A-)DIVER_NJK=nusber) ) .AND. FOUND(2) .AND. FOUND!;
3)
SET RELATION TO A->DIYER_NUr1 INTO E
SELECT 2
SET RELATION TC A->SITE_NL« INTO C
SELECT i
SE T SKIP TC B,C
GO TOP















Prooras ,..: B:\LCE REPQ.FRE
Date ,..,: B-C4-91
Versions .••.. ! cEAEE !v, RepD" t 1.1
Notes:
Prior to rurr.in: this prccsd^e Kith the DO costsaia
it is necessary use LOCATE tEca.se the CONTINUE
clalpssp * '; ir. |hp S S * " !npn
-
. -. h w ' - v * - ill Lilt '».. 4 WWW I
-- Parameters
iRAMETERS gl_nceject, gljilain, gl_suE5ary, gc_heading, gc_estra
I Ths first three psraseters a r ? of tyse Logical.




-- Test for no records found
: ECF(] .OR. .MOT. FCL'NBd
RETURN
BIF
-- tu r n word trap sode off
«rap= .F .
F jjlength < (jsspacinq 16 + 1} + (_pspacing + 1) + 2
SET DEVICE TO SCREEN
DEFINE WINCCk gw_repcrt FRO"* 7,17 TO 11.62 DOUBLE
ACTIVATE HINDOH gw_repcrt
§ 0,1 SAY "Increase the page length fc r this report."







j>Iineno s |i 55^ ilHES * C T9Tw
» rluw^Lc! poraBSIer
IF gI_noeject
IF jeject = "EEFOF.E"
_pe;e:t="NCNE'
ENDIF






ON ESCAPE DC Prnabort
IF SE T (
p








gc_space=SE![ s SPACE ,! )
SET SPACE OFF
gc_tiBe=TIBE{) 'A syste- tise for predefined field
gd_date=DATE{) H systes date '
g]_fandl=.F. fcl first and laet page flag






. H Continue printing flag
gl_Kido»=.T. y flag for checking wide* bands
gn_Iengtr=LEN!gc_headirg) &4 stc r e length of the HEADING
gn_level=2 H current band being p r ccessec
qn_C3c;e=_o=5sr:3 H grab current cage nueber
gnjispace^jspaci-c H get current print spacing
J-- Set up procedure *c r page break
gn_atline=_p]ergt k - (jspacing + 1}
QN PAGE AT LINE gn_atline EJECT PAGE
I- Print Report
PRINTJCr
t— Initialize susiary variables.
r_tsuil=0
IF gljj'ain
ON PABE AT LINE gn_atline DC Pgplain
ELSE
ON PAGE AT LINE gn_atlme DO Pgfcot
ENDIF
DO Pghead





























UnHa*p c:;si»:rv i \ pi He anr/nr ':: 1" 1 : 1 rrcr^ ^.c'^c
IEDURE Upd_Vars
5us
>u"l=r s= us 1 + T I ME
IRN
IP: llpd_Vars








"Page No." ) AT 0,;
: (gl_plain,",_pagenc) PICTURE '999" AT 9,;













t- c'rirt HEADING paraceter ie. F.EPCh": c 0F. m \rare HEADING (expC


















"SitE nams cr iccat.G-" AT 9.;
-"A:'* AT 40,;



















IF 3 I q-_pspace < qn_at!ir.e - (jjspacing 16 + 1)





?7 Date AT 0,;
Nase FUNCTION "TOO" AT 9,;
Air_used PICTURE H 999999 c 9 r AT 40.;
Tesperatur PICTURE B 9??9?9999? K AT 49,;
Depth PICTURE "99999" AT 60.;
Visibility PICTURE "9999999999" AT 66,;
Tiee PICTURE "999.9" AT 77
7









Sena! PICTURE H 999?-9" A T 0,;
ve_rs>.s FUNCTION
e

















































I dBASE IV .QBE file
1 QUALLIST.PRE (joins diver. dbf with aual.dbf a-.ri stores ta tesp5.dbf




IF .NOT. BATON= ! GQCD a
do viol at id
Else
tmmitnn
ACCEFT 'Enter the diver r.uj:e- of the diver »hos cue; list you Kish to find:
'-
to nu(Bbe r
SE T FIELDS TO
SELECT 1
USE DIVER. DEF A5AIN NDU r'DATE
USE QUAL.DB C ASAIN NGUPDATE IN 2 ORDER DIvER_NJ~;
SET EXACT GN
SET FILTER TO ( !A-;>D!VER_NL*=ru!?ber! ) .AND. FOUND;2)
SET RELATION T A->DIYER_NUr; INTO B
SET SKIP TO B
GO TOF
SET FIElDS TO A->FNAr;E.A-^I.A-:iNA^E l B->QLAL_NA-E.B->CD^AN?,t-
>DATE,B;










t Proqrae : B:\QUALRPT.FRS
I Date : 8-04-91





Prior to running this procedure Kith ths DO coasand
it is necessary use LOCATE because the CD* T IN:E
statesent is ir the fain loop.
- Parasete's
RAMETERS gljiceject, gl_plain, gl_5ussary, gc_heading, gc_ex:ra
The first three paraseters ars cf type Logical.
The fourth paraseter is a string. The fifth is extra.
IVATE jjejsct, _Krap
- Test for nc records found
EOF!) .OR. .NOT. FOUNDS)
RETURN
D!F
- tur r nord *r&? scde off
rap=.F.
rlppntHi { I ncr.arir" 1 t M 4 • rcr,;,r nr 4 \ \ + "5
SET DEVICE TG SCREEN
DEFINE WINDOW gw_repcrt FROM 7.1? T 3 11, £2 DDLE.E
ACTIVATE WINDOW gx_rsport
§ 0,1 SAY "Increase the paps length for this report.
6 2,1 SA V "Press any Key ..."
k=INKEY{0!
DEACTIVATE WINDOW cw_report
RELEASE WINDOw gwj sport
RETURN
IT"




















_tite=TIrlE() ii systee tiie for predefined field
93
gd_date=DA T E;j 44 system date *
gl_fandl=.F. 44 first and l35t page flag
gl_prntf lg=.T. 44 Continue printing flag
glj«idcn=.T. H flag for checking KidoK bands
gn_length=LEN(gc_heading) it store length c J the HEADINI
qr,_level=2 £4 current band being processed
qn_page=_pageno 44 g r ah current page nusber
gn_pspace-_pspacing 44 get current print spacing
t— Set up procedure for page break
gn_atline=_plength - (_pspacing + 1}




ON PASE AT LINE gn_atline DC Pgplair
ELSE
ON PASE AT LINE gn_at!ine DC Pgfoot
END IF
DC Pgbead
ql fandKT. U. first physical page started
I— File Loop











44 enable sido* checking
IF gl_prntflg
DO Rsuss


















- Set f lac tc Get cut of DO WHILE Icoc men esca;e is pressec
:0CEDURE Prnabort
_prr)tf lg=. c .
TURN
EOF: Prnatcrt








IF(gl_plain,",_saqenc) PICTURE '999' AT 9,;
Qua! list for: 8 AT 21
- Print HEADING parameter is. FE P CR T FOR* <na»s) HEADING <ex?C;
.NUT. gljilain .AND. gn_length >
V gc_heading FUNCTION u l;V t +LTR!1(STR(_rParci--_lra'-;:':;
9
ID IF
IIF(gl_plain,",gd_date) A T 0,;
nase FUNCTION "T" AT 18,;
li FUNCTION "T" A T 3!,;









: gn_pspace < gn_atline - (_pspacing 16 + 1!






?? Qual_na«s FUNCTION 'I" AT 5,;
Coepany FUNCTION C T" A T 17,;














q]_Hidow= .F . kh disable widow checking
_pspacing=l
i
IF .N0 T . gl_plain
ENDIF
EJECT PA5E
t— is the page nueber greater than the ending page
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